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I.

INTRODUCTION

A Muslim citizen of a North African country entered the United States
through an international airport on a false French passport in January
1999. He admitted that he was traveling on false documents and
immediately requested political asylum. He was held in detention for three
months while his asylum claim was investigated by immigration authorities,
who sought his removal from the United States. In April 1999, an executive
branch immigration judge suspended his removal from the United States,
and granted the immigrant’s request for asylum under 8 U.S.C. section
†
Professor of Constitutional Criminal Law, William Mitchell College of
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Candidate 2010, for their assistance in seeing this article through to completion.
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1158 after a hearing in which the refugee was compelled to testify and his
use of false documents was fully disclosed.
Without having committed any other immigration or criminal offenses,
the refugee was again detained in December 2003, one month before the
running of the five-year statute of limitations for criminal charges for the
January 1999 use of false documents. The refugee was interrogated by
federal officials about his knowledge, contacts and ties with Islamic groups
in his home country and in the United States. He was threatened with
prosecution for his admitted use of false documents if he did not comply by
providing information.
He was indicted in January 2004 while
maintaining he had no information to give.
He was held without bail until April 2004, when he was released on
the condition that he wear an electronic bracelet pending trial. He
subsequently agreed to a “no-incarceration” plea agreement, when the court
denied his motion to dismiss the indictment based on the original grant of
asylum. Ironically, the conviction for use of false documents, to which he
admitted when claiming asylum in 1999, exposed the refugee to removal
and deportation again.
1
– Summary of an actual false documents prosecution.
The foregoing example of how the “War on Terrorism” is
actually being “fought” is merely one more instance of the exercise
of broad executive-branch powers that ranges from torture of
2
3
detainees, to ethnically-targeted enforcement of immigration laws,
to electronic surveillance of virtually all international electronic
4
communication. But this example is the result of a Kafka-esque
contradiction between: (a) the executive branch grant of asylum,
and (b) subsequent criminal prosecution by another arm of that
same executive branch, in which the grant of asylum is not a
1. See Brief of Appellant at 1–4, Hafid Bradei v. United States, No. 05-2771
(8th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005).
2. James C. McKinley, Jr., A Prosecutor Indicts Foes, and Cheney and Gonzales,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A24.
3. Laura Isabel Bauer, They Beg For Our Protection and We Refuse: U.S. Asylum
Law’s Failure to Protect Many of Today’s Refugees, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1092–
93 (2004). Due to the lack of documentation, asylum officers could easily hide
discriminatory motivations or arbitrary decisions from concerned investigators. See
GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GGD-87-33BR, ASYLUM: UNIFORM
APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN—FEW DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED 13–14
(1987) (finding that INS officials were not required to document their asylum
decisions, and thus it was “uncertain whether all applications were treated fairly
and were held to the same standards”).
4. Editorial, Spies, Lies and FISA, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, § 4, at 11.
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defense to acts the refugee was required to admit, (c) once again
exposes the refugee to deportation. It is a modern version of the
unwinnable “Catch-22” that Joseph Heller lampooned in his iconic
5
anti-war novel of the same name.
But that was then, this is now, and the new “Catch-22” facing
refugees who have been granted asylum after using false
documents to enter the United States makes use of an apparent
contradiction between the federal criminal code on the one hand
and asylum/refugee statutes and treaties on the other. These
unresolved contradictions arguably subject all improperly
documented on-arrival asylees to subsequent criminal prosecution,
even though they have established the “well-founded fear of
6
persecution” necessary for the grant of asylum.
This article describes the contradictions between: (a)
standards and procedures for seeking and receiving asylum status
under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 and Article 31(1) of the United Nations
Refugee Convention; (b) removal proceedings described in 8
U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1227; and (c) felony criminal prosecution for
false documents under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1543, 1544 and 1546, for which
full disclosure of entry on false documents and a grant of asylum
has not been recognized as a defense by Congress or the courts.
This article suggests that full disclosure of entry on false
documents and a subsequent grant of asylum should be a full
defense to a post-asylum criminal prosecution for use of those same
false documents. This defense should arise by Congressional
enactment, through judicial use of the Fifth Amendment, or
through common-law concepts of estoppel or res judicata.
II. FALSE DOCUMENTS AND ASYLUM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Those seeking asylum status who have arrived in a member
country of the United Nations cannot be punished for presenting
false documents under the United Nations Refugee Convention,
Article 31(1). The Convention states that member countries
cannot impose penalties on asylum seekers who enter illegally so
long as they: (a) come directly from the country from which they
are seeking asylum, (b) present themselves to authorities without
5. See generally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (University of Michigan 1970).
6. A general trend toward criminalization of immigration issues has been
noted by other commentators. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 469 (2007).
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delay and (c) show good cause for their illegal entry.
Although the Convention does not specifically apply to asylum
seekers who have traveled through third countries before seeking
asylum, the principle that asylum seekers cannot be punished for
presenting false documents when entering a United Nations
member country in order to seek political asylum has found
8
support in other national jurisdictions. There is also considerable
debate over whether the Refugee Convention is self-executing with
9
respect to the provisions of Article 31(1), and therefore also part
10
of domestic law.
Also, the United States is a signatory to the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, which incorporates the 1951
Convention, particularly with respect to refugees who have already
had a determination of asylum status, as described in a public
opinion letter by the United Nations High Commissioner for
11
Refugees. Further, even if the Convention and Protocol are not
held to be self-executing, and thus not incorporated into domestic
law, the same principles enunciated in the Convention and
Protocol have already been recognized in domestic United States
12
jurisdictions.
III. FALSE DOCUMENTS AND ASYLUM UNDER DOMESTIC LAW
Under the Immigration Code, a non-citizen who lacks proper
documentation to remain in the United States may be placed in
removal proceedings, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (for those who have
not formally entered the United States relying on valid immigration

7. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, ch. V, art. 31(1), July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter “Refugee Convention”].
8. See Regina v. Uxbridge Magistrate’s Court ex parte Adimi, [2001] Q.B. 667
(U.K.).
9. Refugee Convention, supra note 7.
10. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1985); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1984); Douglas Gross, The Right of Asylum
Under U.S. Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125, 1129 & n.30 (1980); Deborah Cohan, et
al., Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee Policy, 21 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 504 (1986).
11. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], UNHCR’S
POSITION ON THE CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NEEDS OF INDIVIDUALS
FROM KOSOVO, ¶ 29 (2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/
449664ea2.pdf.
12. See Akinmade v. I.N.S., 196 F.3d 951, 955 (3rd Cir. 1999) (citing In re
O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1079 (BIA 1998)). See also Damaize-Job v. I.N.S., 787 F.2d
1332 (9th Cir. 1986).
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documents) and 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (for those who have entered the
United States lawfully but who no longer have authorization to
13
remain).
In either case, an immigrant may seek asylum status
under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 by establishing that he or she is a “refugee”
as defined by section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and
14
Nationality Act. An applicant that carries his or her burden of
13. The following compares the methods of obtaining asylum in the United
States:
The two main ways of obtaining asylum in the United States are through
the affirmative process and through the defensive process. . . .
In the affirmative asylum process, individuals who are physically present in
the United States, regardless of how they arrived . . . may apply for
asylum. . . . [A]sylum-seekers must apply for asylum within one year from
the date of last arrival in the United States. . . . If the applicant’s case is
not approved . . . the case is referred to an Immigration Judge (IJ) at the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) for de novo
consideration of the application.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Obtaining Asylum in the United States:
Two Paths, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (select “Services and Benefits”
from the menu bar, then “Humanitarian Benefits,” “Asylum,” and “Obtaining
Asylum in the United States: Two Paths”) (last visited Dec. 14, 2008). Affirmative
asylum applicants are subject to deportation if found ineligible by USCIS and an
immigration judge.
In the defensive asylum process, applicants seek asylum as a defense against
removal from the United States. Immigration judges hear these applications in
adversarial proceedings: “If the applicant is found eligible, the judge orders
asylum to be granted. If the applicant is found ineligible for asylum, the [judge]
determines whether the applicant is eligible for any other forms of relief from
removal . . . . [D]ecisions can be appealed by either the government or the
applicant.” Id.
Aliens generally are placed into defensive asylum processing in one of
two ways:
• they are referred to an IJ by USCIS after a finding of ineligibility at the
conclusion of the “affirmative” asylum process, or
• they are placed in removal proceedings because they:
• were apprehended in the United States or at a U.S. port-of-entry
without proper legal documents or in violation of their status, or
• were caught trying to enter the United States without proper
documentation and were placed in the expedited removal process
and found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture by an
Asylum Officer.
Id.
14. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines "refugee" in section
101(a)(42) as:
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
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proof before an executive branch immigration judge will be
permitted to remain in the United States under the conditions
15
mandated for asylum status.
The highest immigration
administrative appeal authority, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), has held that “there may be reasons, fully consistent with the
claim of asylum, that will cause a person to possess false documents,
such as the creation and use of a false document to escape
16
persecution by facilitating travel.” This view has found support in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
[t]he BIA set forth a clear division between two categories
of false document presentations:
(1) the presentation of a fraudulent document in an
asylum adjudication for the purpose of establishing
the elements of an asylum claim; and
(2) “the presentation of a fraudulent document for the
purpose of escaping immediate danger from an
alien’s country of origin or resettlement, or for the
17
purpose of gaining entry into the United States.”
Congress has also provided that those granted “asylum status”
(whether an entry has been on false documents or not) be
permitted to:
particular social group, or political opinion, or
(B) in such circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation
(as defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is
within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, within the country in which such person is
habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. The term "refugee" does
not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who
has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo
such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or
she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution
for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2006).
15. INA § 208(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (2006).
16. In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1083.
17. Akinmade, 196 F.3d at 955 (quoting In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 1081).
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1. remain in the United States, not subject to removal or
18
return;
2. seek and secure employment in the United States;
19
and
20
3. travel within the United States and without.
Apparently, Congress intended that a grant of asylum includes
the right to remain indefinitely in the United States and to exercise
21
many of the same benefits granted to permanent legal residents.
However, on its face, the statute does not discuss the
relationship between the grant of asylum through executive branch
administrative adjudication and subsequent criminal prosecution
initiated by that same executive branch based on the same acts
upon which asylum had been granted. Because the statute does
not specifically provide that the immigration court’s grant of
asylum also provides a defense to subsequent prosecution for the
use of false documents, and because the adversary immigration
proceedings would have required the asylum applicant to fully
reveal and admit under oath the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution is based, there is no meaningful defense to a
false-documents indictment following the grant of asylum.
IV. PROOF OF A “WELL-FOUNDED FEAR...”
The President has the power to determine refugee status as an
outgrowth of executive branch authority over immigration matters,
and can delegate that decision-making authority as he or she “may
22
specify.” The asylum process is governed by the Immigration and
Naturalization Act under section 208 which establishes the
guidelines and procedures for an asylum application to be
23
granted. An asylum applicant must carry the burden of proving a
“well founded fear of persecution” on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
24
opinion, but cannot prevail without testifying under oath and
18. INA § 208(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) (2006).
19. INA § 208(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B) (2006).
20. INA § 208(c)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(C) (2006).
21. INA §§ 208(c)(1)(A), (B), (C), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(c)(1)(A), (B), (C)
(2006).
22. INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006).
23. INA § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2006).
24. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 93 (2nd ed.
American Immigration Law Foundation 1991).
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25

V. FALSE DOCUMENTS, ENTRY AND ASYLUM
There are several ways in which document fraud can arise
during the entry/asylum process, depending on whether the alien
has intentionally attempted to perpetrate a fraud by presenting
26
false documents without revealing their falsity.
First, an alien can present false documents and claim before
an immigration official that they are properly issued documents. If
the documents are found to be false, the alien is barred from entry

25. In re Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 118 (BIA 1989).
26. Under revisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act to address the
problems of document fraud, Congress enacted the “Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996” (IIRAIRA). Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. The changes to INA § 274C increased the penalties
for document fraud. Juan P. Osuna, The 1996 Immigration Act: Document Fraud and
Alien Smuggling, 73 No. 44 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1605, 1605 (Nov. 18, 1996).
Section 274C(a) makes it unlawful for a person or entity knowingly:
(1) to forge, counterfeit, alter, or falsely make any document for the
purpose of satisfying a requirement of this chapter or to obtain a
benefit under this chapter,
(2) to use, attempt to use, possess, obtain, accept, or receive or to
provide any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document
in order to satisfy any requirement of this chapter or to obtain a
benefit under this chapter,
(3) to use or attempt to use or to provide or attempt to provide any
document lawfully issued to or with respect to a person other than
the possessor (including a deceased individual) for the purpose of
satisfying a requirement of this chapter or obtaining a benefit under
this chapter,
(4) to accept or receive or to provide any document lawfully issued to or
with respect to a person other than the possessor (including a
deceased individual) for the purpose of complying with section
1324a(b) of this title or obtaining a benefit under this chapter, or
(5) to prepare, file, or assist another in preparing or filing, any
application for benefits under this chapter, or any document
required under this chapter, or any document submitted in
connection with such application or document, with knowledge or
in reckless disregard of the fact that such application or document
was falsely made or, in whole or in part, does not relate to the person
on whose behalf it was or is being submitted, or
(6) (A) to present before boarding a common carrier for the purpose of
coming to the United States a document which relates to the alien's
eligibility to enter the United States, and (B) to fail to present such
document to an immigration officer upon arrival at a United States
port of entry.
INA § 274C(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (2006).
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27

to the United States.
Second, if the alien presents falsified
documents, and the falsity of those documents is not discovered
until after entry into the United States, the alien is subject to
federal civil and criminal penalties in addition to immigration
28
penalties. Third, if an alien destroys documents en route to the
United States and arrives without documents, the alien would be
29
similarly ineligible for entry absent a congressionally-mandated
30
exception for asylum seekers.
However, if an alien were to arrive before an immigration
official and disclose the fact that the alien has shown false
documentation to board a United States common carrier abroad
and presents the false documents upon entry, the alien may seek
31
asylum. Although it is lawful to request asylum upon entry on an
admittedly false document, Congress has not excluded subsequent
criminal prosecution for the use of those false documents, even
32
when the alien’s asylum claim has been granted.

27. “Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks
to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other
documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit
provided under this Act is inadmissible.” INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2006).
28. INA § 274C, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2006).
29. “[P]resent[ing] before boarding a common carrier for the purpose of
coming to the United States a document which relates to the alien’s eligibility to
enter the United States, and . . . fail[ing] to present such document to an
immigration officer upon arrival at a United States port of entry” is prohibited.
INA § 274C(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(6) (2006). Any alien in violation of INA
section 274C is subject to deportation and may be found inadmissible to the
United States as well as having to pay civil monetary fines.
30. INA section 274C(a)(6) establishes document fraud liability for aliens
who fail to present an entry document upon arrival in the United States after
having presented such a document to board a common carrier to the United
States. INA § 274C(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(6) (2006). Recognizing the fact
that genuine asylum seekers are prejudiced by this part of the statute, however,
Congress enacted a discretionary waiver for persons granted asylum or
withholding from deportation. Juan P. Osuna, supra note 26, at 1607.
31. Providing for a waiver for false documents is in line with In re D-L- & A-M-,
20 I. & N. Dec. 409 (BIA 1991), which held that two Cuban nationals were not
excludable for fraud or misrepresentation when they used fraudulent Spanish
passports to board a U.S.-bound airplane. Id. at 413. Upon arrival the Cuban
nationals revealed their true identities and immediately sought asylum. Id. This
case provides an example of the proper use of a waiver in those situations where
an alien obtains a false passport to be able to board an airplane for the purposes of
arriving in the United States to seek asylum.
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006) (forgery or false use of passport); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1544 (2006) (misuse of passport). See also discussion infra Part VIII.
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VI. “ENTRY” INTO THE U.S. AND ASYLUM CLAIMS
The asylum application process begins when an applicant
arrives in the United States by presenting herself or himself at an
immigration port of entry, which includes border entry points and
33
international airports. How the alien arrived in the United States
matters with respect to whether the alien will be eligible for asylum
34
or not. An immigration official, charged with verifying passport
and visa information and visa documents, is the first contact point
at which applicants may seek asylum—by informing the
Immigration Officer they are seeking asylum or are in fear of
35
persecution.
The administrative decision-making process begins with a nonadversarial interview with an asylum officer within forty-five days of
36
the arrival of the alien to the United States. The asylum applicant
has the burden of providing all information concerning identity,
37
including name, date and place of birth, and nationality. The
asylum officer has discretion to grant or deny asylum; the officer
may also refer an asylum applicant to an immigration judge for
determination of the legitimacy of the asylum claim based on the
testimony of the applicant and corroborative evidence produced in
a trial-like administrative proceeding before an immigration
38
judge.
33. See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2006).
34. Noncitizens are subject to expedited removal if the immigration officer at
the port of entry denies admission based on false documents or no documents.
INA §§ 212(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7) (2006) (regarding
inadmissibility); INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2006) (regarding expedited
removal).
35. A noncitizen who arrives on false or no documents, and is subject to
expedited removal under INA section 235(b) and who indicates an intention to
apply for asylum or expresses fear of prosecution, a fear of torture, or a fear of
return to his or her country, must be referred to an asylum officer for a
determination of credible fear of persecution or torture. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)
(2008).
36. INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) (2006).
37. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2008). One of the main reasons that the verification
is made is to determine if the asylum seeker is inadmissible due to criminal
history or to determine if there are asylum ineligibility issues. See id. Asylum
will not be granted unless and until the identity of the asylum seeker is verified
through the Automated Visa Lookout System. INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(d)(5)(A)(i) (2006). The identity is then checked against all of the
databases maintained by the Attorney General or Secretary of State. Id.
38. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b)–(c) (2008). If the individual is found to have
credible fear, the individual is placed in withholding-of-removal proceedings
before an immigration judge for full consideration of the request for withholding
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VII. IMMIGRATION REMOVAL/ASYLUM HEARINGS
Proceedings before an immigration judge are contested
hearings, in which the executive branch is represented by an
39
attorney for the Department of Homeland Security Division.
Although evidentiary rules are relaxed as compared to proceedings
40
in Article III trial courts, the hearings are conducted in a judicial
atmosphere and immigration judges are required to tape-record
41
the reasonable-fear review proceedings.
The burden of proof
regarding the refugee status of the applicant for asylum remains on
42
the applicant and the immigration judge may not grant asylum
without the applicant’s testimony under oath and exposure to
43
cross-examination by a DHS attorney.
This means that before an applicant who has submitted false
documents to enter the United States can obtain asylum, an
executive branch administrative law judge must find that the
applicant’s use of false documents was justified and was not a bar to
the initial grant of asylum. And although this finding may be
44
appealed by either party, there is no question that once this
finding has become final it is binding on further actions by either
BCIS or ICE. The review of an immigration judge’s decision on
asylum claims will be subject to de novo review on nonfactual issues
and the clearly erroneous standard on factual issues, including the
45
credibility of testimony.
A decision of an immigration judge
becomes administratively final upon waiver of appeal or upon
46
expiration of the time to appeal if no appeal is taken. However,
only. 8 CFR § 208.31(e) (2008).
39. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
OFFICE OF THE IMMIGRATION CHIEF JUDGE, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE COURT MANUAL,
ch. 4 (June 20, 2008), available at 2008 WL 4335214.
40. ANKER, supra note 24, at 89.
41. Memorandum from the Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office
of the Chief Immigration Judge, Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum
No. 99-5: Implementation of Article 3 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture
(May 14, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm99/
99_5.pdf. But see Bauer, supra note 3, at 1093 (citing “The Epidavros Project
2000,” Bauer states that “[n]o cameras or recording devices are allowed at these
hearings, and the entire process is ‘closed and confidential.’”).
42. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2008).
43. In re Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116, 117–18 (BIA 1989); INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2006).
44. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) (2008).
45. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (2008); In re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462, 464 (BIA
2002).
46. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39 (2008).
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there is no mention of the finding of refugee status—and the grant
of asylum—having any preclusive effect on criminal charges arising
from the refugee’s use of false documents to enter the United
States.
XII. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR ENTRY ON FALSE DOCUMENTS
Three sections of the U.S. Code are most directly implicated in
criminal prosecutions for the use of false immigration documents.
The first, 18 U.S.C. § 1543, establishes penalties for up to ten years
for a person who:
willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or
furnishes to another for use any such false, forged,
counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or
instrument purporting to be a passport, or any passport
validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of
any condition therein prescribed invalidating the same
47
....
In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 1544 criminalizes misuse of a passport:
Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to
use, any passport issued or designed for the use of
another; or whoever willfully and knowingly uses or
attempts to use any passport in violation of the conditions
or restrictions therein contained, or of the rules
prescribed pursuant to the laws regulating the issuance of
passports; or whoever willfully and knowingly furnishes,
disposes of, or delivers a passport to any person, for use by
another than the person for whose use it was originally
48
issued and designed. . . .
And finally, 18 U.S.C. § 1546 criminalizes fraud and misuse of visas,
permits, and other documents:
Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or
falsely makes any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa,
permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt
card, or other document prescribed by statute or
regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay
or employment in the United States, or utters, uses,
attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any
such visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration
receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or
47.
48.

18 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006).
18 U.S.C. § 1544 (2006).
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regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay
or employment in the United States, knowing it to be
forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to have
been procured by means of any false claim or statement,
or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully
49
obtained. . . .
These three criminal statutes, on their face, clearly impose
criminal liability for acts related to entry on false documents, and
are not discussed as part of the immunity from immigration or civil
50
When asylum is
penalties described in the grant of asylum.
51
granted it is granted for an indefinite period. The grant of asylum
means that, as long as asylum is granted, the alien cannot be
52
returned to any country. An asylee may lose status due to (1)
fraud in the application, (2) the application being filed after April
1, 1997, where the person meets one of the categories of
ineligibility defined in INA section 208(c)(2), or (3) the applicant
having applied after April 1, 1997, where the person no longer has
a well-founded fear because the conditions in the country of origin
53
have changed. An alien may have withholding revoked when (1)
there is no longer a fear of persecution because of changes in the
country of origin, (2) there is fraud in the application, or (3) he or
she falls under one of the grounds (such as having been convicted
of committing a serious crime) which would have initially barred
54
withholding. Congress has failed to establish a similar immunity
for criminal prosecutions for commission of the same acts.
IX. REMOVAL FOR POST-ASYLUM CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
There is no dispute that asylum is not a grant of impunity, and
that the grant of asylum does not create immunity from
55
deportation for crimes committed after the grant of asylum. And
the Immigration Code does permit deportation for criminal
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006).
50. See 67 No. 30 INTERPRETER RELEASES 887, 888 (1990) (discussing the
inability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to detain and deny parole
to a political refugee based solely on the refugee’s use of false documents).
51. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(e) (2008).
52. See Andriansian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 n.14 (9th Cir. 1999).
53. 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a) (2008).
54. § 208.24(b); IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK
495 (10th ed. 2006).
55. Crimes involving moral turpitude, for example, are bars to admissibility
and also make an alien removable from the United States. INA
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006).
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convictions based on the presentation of false documents or fraud
56
after the initial asylum request has been granted. Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227, aliens are subject to deportation upon conviction of crimes
of moral turpitude (including fraud) which carry a sentence of one
57
58
year or more, and for violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1546, which
imposes criminal penalties for presentation of false immigration
59
documents.
This means that, on its face, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 authorizes
deportation for precisely the same factual admissions necessary to
the initial grant of asylum before an immigration judge, when
those admissions are also violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1543, 1544 and
1546. And although Congress enacted “asylum” provisions which
act as a complete defense to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or §
1227, these exceptions do not specifically apply as defenses to
criminal prosecutions. In the absence of judicial or Congressional
intervention expanding an administrative grant of asylum into a
defense to subsequent criminal charges, the Justice Department
Criminal Division is free to assert that:
1. Congress must have intended to limit executive branch
discretion to carry out removal and deportation
proceedings by imposing the asylum provisions in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158;
2. Congress did not intend to limit executive branch
discretion in bringing subsequent criminal charges based
on the same acts at issue in the asylum claim because it did
not specifically set out 8 U.S.C. § 1158 as a defense to
prosecutions under either 18 U.S.C. § 1543, 1544, or 1546;
or
3. conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1543, 1544, and 1546 exposes
the defendant to a second removal and deportation
proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or § 1227, since the
conviction occurs following the grant of asylum.
This interpretation of the reach of 8 U.S.C. § 1158, as applied
to admittedly false documents presented at the time of entry “for
the purpose of escaping immediate danger from an alien’s country
56. INA § 237(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(B) (2006).
57. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
58. Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006)).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006). An alien who admits committing a crime
or who admits to committing elements of certain crimes is inadmissible. INA
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2008). See also KURZBAN, supra
note 54, at 52.
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of origin or resettlement, or for the purpose of gaining entry into
60
the United States,” can hardly be characterized as either logical or
rational. And it renders the asylum provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1158 a
practical nullity, particularly when the entry on false documents has
been fully revealed and litigated in immigration proceedings which
resulted in the grant of asylum in the first place.
X. DISCRETIONARY EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH POWER
Prior to the establishment of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003, immigration matters were under
the jurisdiction of the Justice Department’s Immigration and
61
Naturalization Service (INS) and the Attorney General. However,
INS was absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security,
headed by a new cabinet level secretary appointed by the
62
President. Its enforcement responsibilities were assigned to the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) and
immigration decision-making was assigned to the Bureau of
63
Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS).
During the period when the Justice Department had
jurisdiction over immigration matters, the Department and
Attorney General possessed broad discretion to initiate removal
proceedings against any non-citizen, but this discretion was not
64
without limit.
Similarly, the Justice Department and Attorney
General had—and retained—broad discretion to initiate criminal
65
66
prosecutions, but this discretion, too, had limitations. Prior to
the separation of immigration matters from the Justice
Department, the Attorney General was in the anomalous position
of granting asylum through delegation of authority to an
immigration judge and criminally indicting the same refugee on
the same facts.
The separation of immigration enforcement and decision60. Akinade v. INS, 196 F.3d 951, 955 (3d Cir. 1999).
61. See 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 33 (2008).
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1950); DiPeppe v.
Quarantillo, 337 F.3d 326, 327 (3rd Cir. 2003); Abdulah v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 543,
549 (3rd Cir. 2001); Kowalczyk v. INS, 245 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2001);
Akbarin v. INS, 699 F.2d 839, 846 (1st Cir. 1982).
65. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
66. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962); United States v. Rushing, 313
F.3d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 2002).
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making from the Justice Department to the Department of
Homeland Security makes the apparent contradiction less obvious,
but no less real. Since it is the President who, in the first instance,
possesses and delegates the power to determine whether an
applicant is a refugee, the grant of asylum by a BCIS immigration
judge, rather than an INS judge, is no less an exercise of executive
branch decision-making. Similarly, the Attorney General and
Justice Department are delegated certain powers by the President,
and respect that must be accorded to administrative findings of an
executive branch administrative law judge remains essentially the
same.
In the absence of a specific congressional enactment that
extends executive branch administrative findings to a defense to
executive branch-initiated criminal prosecutions, it must fall to the
courts to find a conceptual foundation upon which the
administrative asylum finding might be interposed to prevent a
subsequent indictment and conviction based on the same facts.
Two possible approaches arise from Fifth Amendment principles
and the possible application of estoppel principles to the factual
findings upon which asylum was granted under either common law
or due process principles.
XI. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND POST-ASYLUM CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
Of course, it goes without saying that due process prohibitions
against compelled testimony apply to criminal prosecutions for
fraud or the use of false documents, but are not relevant to the
requirement that an asylum applicant must testify under oath as a
necessary condition to the favorable exercise of executive branch
67
discretion in granting asylum status.
However, when a
discretionary grant of asylum by one agency of the executive
branch is followed by a discretionary criminal prosecution on the
same facts by another agency of the same executive branch, it
would seem that due process principles might be employed to
prevent the contradictory use of executive branch discretion. The
argument is even more compelling when a conviction would
expose the refugee to a second deportation proceeding based on
67. Burden of proof is placed squarely on the asylum seeker. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(a) (2008). The testimony must be detailed and specific. INS v. EliasZacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992).
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the same false document entry into the United States.
Another possible approach might arise from the due process
obligation of the prosecution in a criminal case to prove all
68
elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Once a
refugee has carried the burden of proof necessary to be granted
asylum status by one agency of the executive branch by testifying in
a contested hearing, it would seem obvious that another agency of
that same executive branch would be unable to carry the much
69
greater burden of proof required for a criminal conviction.
Finally, the due process doctrine prohibits the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion to punish the exercise of a defendant’s
70
rights. A presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arises when
post-trial prosecutorial discretion increases a defendant’s liability,
but in necessarily discretionary pre-trial prosecutorial decision71
making only actual vindictiveness is prohibited. However, when a
refugee has succeeded in “proving-up” an asylum claim, subsequent
criminal prosecution on the same issues would seem to raise many
of the same concerns regarding improper use of prosecutorial
discretion to punish the exercise of the right to claim asylum.
XII. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND ASYLUM PROCEEDINGS
Another approach might be the use of equitable principles of
estoppel to prevent the re-litigation of previously determined facts.
This has long been recognized as a means of preventing a
defendant from having to litigate the same facts against the same
72
plaintiff, in a defensive use of collateral estoppel. Further, the
Supreme Court has held that, even in the absence of the common
law requirement of “mutuality of estoppel,” due process is not
offended if estoppel is used to preclude a defendant from relitigating claims it has previously litigated against a different
plaintiff, provided the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to
73
litigate the issue in a previous proceeding.
However, given the differing burdens of proof in criminal and
civil cases, a criminal acquittal in which the prosecution failed to
68.
69.
70.
71.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970).
See United States v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 26–27 (1974).
See Nancy J. McCurley, Prosecutorial Discretion, 71 GEO L.J. 449, 451 (1982).
2 DAVID S. RUDSTEIN, C. PETER ERLINDER & DAVID C. THOMAS,
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW § 9:06 (2008).
72. Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill., 402 U.S. 313, 328–29 (1995).
73. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 322 (1999).
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carry its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
prevent the litigation of the same facts in a civil proceeding that
were at issue in the criminal proceeding. Conversely, however,
failure of the government to prevail in a civil proceeding must
preclude a criminal prosecution on the same facts. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is impossible for facts not proved by either a
preponderance, clear and convincing evidence, or any other lesser
civil standard.
The question is whether the findings of an administrative
immigration proceeding can have preclusive effect in subsequent
criminal proceedings arising from the same facts. The Court’s
reasoning in the Parklane case suggests that such an application of
estoppel principles is possible, and perhaps desirable.
In applying its due process analysis to prevent the re-litigation
of facts previously litigated, the basis for the claimed preclusion was
an administrative proceeding in which the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) had prevailed in claims of improper corporate
conduct against Parklane Hosiery Co.
In a subsequent
stockholders derivative action against the corporation, the plaintiff
sought to prevent the defendant corporation from re-litigating facts
74
that had been alleged by the SEC.
The Court held that due
process permitted the plaintiff to prevent the corporation from relitigating factual defenses which it had asserted and upon which it
had not prevailed in the SEC proceeding because the defendant
had the opportunity and incentive to fully litigate the issue in the
75
administrative proceeding.
Nothing in Parklane suggests that findings from an
administrative hearing before an immigration judge, initiated by
INS or ICE, should be treated any differently than administrative
76
Because the subsequent
proceedings initiated by the SEC.
proceeding at issue is a criminal proceeding, rather than a civil suit
as was the case in Parklane, it would seem that the case for issue
preclusion is even more compelling—particularly since the party
against whom the estoppel would be asserted would be the same
party (i.e. the executive branch), with the same incentive to oppose
the grant of asylum, and because it is well-established that the alien
in immigration proceedings has the burden of proof to establish

74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 351.
See id.
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77

both identity and eligibility for asylum.
With respect to the factual questions of (a) the “justification”
for commission of a lesser offense (presenting false documents) to
78
prevent a larger harm (persecution), and (b) the absence of
culpable mens rea under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1543 and 1546, which
require presentation with the willful intention to deceive U.S.
79
authorities regarding a material fact, both were fully litigated.
The use of collateral estoppel to prevent the same acts from being
used as the basis for a criminal prosecution would be consistent
with the due process requirements set out by the Supreme Court in
the Parklane case.
XIII. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL AND “CHANGE OF POSITION”
However, viewed at another level, the determination by the
executive branch immigration judge that the asylee had carried his
burden to establish that he properly qualified for asylum, despite
having presented admittedly false documents to gain entry to the
United States, should be binding on other executive branch
entities as well. Principles of judicial estoppel are intended to
protect the integrity of the Court and should be invoked to prevent
a perversion of the judicial process. It is intended to protect the
Courts from a litigant changing positions in two different legal
80
proceedings when its interests have changed.
Given the decision of the executive branch immigration judge
granting asylum over the opposition of other executive branch
lawyers, the decision to seek criminal prosecution despite the grant
of asylum can be seen as a change in position by the executive
branch. It was already determined that the use of false documents
did not constitute a basis for denying the asylum claims. Under
such circumstances, some of the Circuits have held that the district
77. INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); Olujoke v. Gonzalez, 411
F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2005); Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir.
1987); In re Dass, 20 I. & N. Dec. 120, 124 (BIA 1989).
78. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409–11 (1980); United States v.
Khalje, 658 F.2d 90, 93 (2nd Cir. 1981) (holding a justification defense available
but not applicable on the facts).
79. See United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898, 902 (2nd Cir. 1963).
80. Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1996); accord
Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1987). See also United
States v. Rushing, 313 F.3d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 2002) (regarding a “change in
position” by the Justice Department giving rise to Due Process issues requiring a
hearing as to the motivations animating the change in position).
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court is obligated to hold a hearing to determine whether the
81
change was based upon proper motive.
Even in the absence of improper motive in the record, a
drastic change in position merits a hearing into whether the
change in position was a result of improper motive. Such a hearing
was ordered in a case where a prosecutor claimed before a jury that
the Justice Department would deport a witness who had confessed
to perjury; after the trial was over, no such deportation took place.
The appeals court, in remanding the case for fact-finding into
improper prosecutorial motive, observed that “[t]he contrast
between the government’s stated intention and what actually
82
occurred [was] too jarring to overlook.”
However, the application of estoppel principles to government
83
actions comes under special scrutiny. Beyond the factors usually
applicable to non-government actors, it requires that the
84
government commit a wrongful act that causes serious injustice,
and that the public’s interest will not be damaged by the
85
application of the doctrine. The question for the courts to decide
is whether it is in the public interest to invoke equitable principles
to estop an agency of the executive branch from bringing criminal
charges for the same acts that an administrative judge, of the same
executive branch, found were not subject to penalty based on the
86
defendant having carried his civil burden.
XIV. CONCLUSION
The apparent contradiction between a grant of asylum (which

81. See United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 26–27 (2nd Cir. 1996).
82. Rushing, 313 F.3d at 436.
83. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60
(1984).
84. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 787 (1981).
85. Morgan v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1984).
86. Principles of res judicata may also prevent a litigant in a previous
proceeding from asserting claims that could have been asserted but were not. Had
the prior proceeding been a civil proceeding, and had the executive branch failed
to prevail on a preponderance of the evidence standard, a criminal prosecution
(or a subsequent civil complaint) on the same “core” of facts would be barred by
principles of res judicata. See Semteck Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (which lower courts have also applied to quasi judicial
proceedings). See, e.g., Graybill v. United States Postal Service, 782 F.2d 1567, 1571
(citing Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1981)), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986); Reynolds v. Comm’r, 861 F.2d 469, 472–74 (6th Cir.
1988).
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is a defense to civil immigration penalties) and the absence of a
defense to subsequent criminal prosecution for use of the same
false documents upon which the asylum claim was grounded would
best be resolved through Congressional action. An amendment to
existing immigration statutes that clearly extended immunity from
prosecution to issues considered by the immigration judge in
granting asylum status would make clear that the contradictory use
of executive branch discretion to grant asylum and then prosecute
for the same acts does not comport with Congressional intent.
However, absent Congressional action, the courts have an
obligation under common-law principles to prevent a litigant from
benefiting by taking two different positions against the same party.
Moreover, Fifth Amendment principles relating to coerced
testimony and fundamental fairness in the federal courts also
provide potential judicial remedies for the contradictory exercise of
executive branch discretionary powers.
In the absence of
principled limitations upon the criminalization of false document
asylum claims, the invitation to the abuse of the executive branch
power remains undiminished.
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